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of this article) the Board decited Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 NLRB No. 48, BNA 1966 DAILY LAB. REP. No.
212, at D-1 (1966). The Board in a carefully worded opinion held that, not only is it an unfair labor practice to
refuse to bargain over the effects of a permanent shutdown of part of a business, but also to refuse to bargain
over the decision itself. The Board found that the Respondent permanently closed one plant of a multi-plant
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thereby avoided the total shutdown implications of the Darlington case. The Board specifically rejected the
reasoning of the Eighth Circuit and the Third Circuit in the Adams Dairy and Royal Plating & Polishing cases,
respectively, and stated inter alia that if decisions to contract out are subjects for collective bargaining, then it
is '. . . a fortiori true with respect to decisions regarding the relocation or termination of a portion of the
business.' It is submitted that this decision was to be anticipated and that it is likely that the same rationale will
apply to a total cessation of business."
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The Role of Collective Bargaining
in Decisions to Change Operations
Harvey M. Adelstein
Recent decisions have made some important changes ", the em-
ployer's obligation to bargain in the area of plant removal and closing.
Mr. Adelstein examines the effects these cases have had upon employers
and umons alike in determining when and how they can satisfy the duty
to bargain over basic decisions involving changes en operations. He
concludes that these decisions have resulted en confusion, wasted effort,
and a breakdown en the instituation of collective bargaining. As a partial
solution to this problem, he suggests that appropriate procedures should
be developed to deal with important tssues, such as decisions relating to
plant removal, plant closing, and going out of business, which may arise
during the life of a collective bargaining agreement, rather than postpon-
ing negotiations to the expiration of the agreement.
he obligation of an employer to bargain collectively over the
decision and effects of plant removal, plant dosing and going
out of business has been discussed, researched, and subjected to care-
fal analysis recently.' No answer has been found as to the ability
of the institution of collective
bargaining to cope with the
TM AUTHOR (A.B., Kenyon College, problems created by such man-
LLB., Western Reserve Umversity) is agement actions. No answer
a practicing attorney in Chicago, Illinois. will be found m this artide -
only opinion and suggestions
will be offered.
Since the passage of the Wagner Acte m 1935, which first
embodied the concept of "bargaining m good faith," the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) and the courts have been
interpreting and shaping that concept. The Labor Management Re-
lations Act' (the act) makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees."4 This duty is defined in section 8 (d) of that actO
1 See Schatzka, The Employer's Unilateral Act - A Per Se Violation - Sometimes,
44 TEXAS L. REv. 470 (1966); Comment, Labor Agreements - Implied Limitations
on Plant Removal and Relocation, 1965 DUKE LJ. 546.
249 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964)
361 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 5 141-87 (1964).
4 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), as amended, 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1964) (The National Labor Relations Act was re-enacted
as 5 101 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947).
SNational Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
5 158(d) (1964).
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which provides that "to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession."6
Recent decisions of the NLRB and the courts have apparently
drastically changed an employer's obligation to "bargain in good
faith" in the area of plant removal and closing. Similarly, section
8(a) (3) of the act,7 which prohibits an employer from discrimi-
nating "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization,"' is directly involved in this area due
to the recent Supreme Court decision in Textile Workers v Dar-
lington Mfg. Co.' and the interpretations thereof.
It is the effect of these recent decisions on the collective bar-
gaining process that is the concern of this article. It is submitted
at the outset that the decisions have placed upon employers and
unions alike an impossible task of determining for themselves when
and how they can satisfy the duty to bargain over basic decisions
involving changes in operations.
I. FIBREBOARD AND TOWN & COUNTRY THEORY
In its original Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. ° case, the NLRB
was considering the question of whether an employer, without
any discriminatory motivation, violated secton 8 (a) (5) of the
act when he failed to notify and negotiate with a union about a
dectston to subcontract work which had been previously done by
bargaining unit employees. The case involved the contracting out
of all plant maintenance work which resulted in the discharge of all
employees in a collective bargaining unit of maintenance employees.
There was no question of discriminatory motivation in the case.
Prior to the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement,
ONational labor Relations Act § 8(d), as amended, 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964)
7 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (3) (1964)
8 Ibfd.
)380 U.S. 263 (1965)
10 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), rev'd on rehearmg, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962),
enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), af'd, Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)
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the employer notified the union of its decision to subcontract all
maintenance work and this decision was put into effect upon the
termination of the agreement. In this first case, the Board held
that there was no unlawful refusal to bargain since all the employer
was required to do was bargain with the union representing his
employees concerning the-effect of the move or subcontract on the
wages, hours and other conditions of employment of those em-
ployees who would be affected by the change. The failure or re-
fusal to bargain over the effect in such cases had long been held
to be a violation of section 8(a) (5) " Therefore, the NLRB
found that there had been no violation since the company was will-
ing to bargain about the effects of the subcontract which was all
the law required."2
This bargaining requirement over managerial changes was
changed, however, in Town & Country Mfg. Co."3 In that case, a
company unilaterally decided to subcontract its entire hauling opera-
tion. The result -of this subcontract was the termination of em-
ployment of all truck drivers in the collective bargaining unit for
which a union had been certified as bargaining agent. The decision
was made and effectuated without prior notice to, or discussion with,
the union.
In Town & Country, section 8(a) (3) and section 8(a) (5)
violations were alleged, and the Board found that the drivers had
been discharged for discriminatory reasons in violation of section
8 (a) (3). Moreover, the Board found that the termination of this
portion of the employer's business constituted a refusal to bargain
under section 8(a) (5) due to the fact that the employer had re-
fused to bargain because the change was motivated by anti-umon
animus and an attempt to undermine the union as bargaining re-
presentative of the employees. However, the Board did not stop
at that point in regard to the section 8(a) (5) violation. The Board
stated that even if the subcontracting had been motivated solely
by economic considerations the unilateral action of subcontracting
was, nevertheless, violative of the act since the dectston itself to sub-
contract was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The
Town & Country decision thus, by dictum, overruled the prior
Fibreboard case in the following terms:
11 See Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480, rerd on other grounds,
211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954); Rome Prods. Co., 77 N.LR.B. 1217 (1948).
1 2 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.RLB. 1558, 1561 (1961).
L3 136 N.L.R3. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
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[T]he elimination of unit jobs, albeit for economic reasons, is a
matter within the statutory phrase "other terms and conditions of
employment" and is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining
witun the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. Expe-
rience has shown that candid discussion of mutual problems
by labor and management frequently results in their resolution
with attendant benefit to both sides. Business operations may
profitably continue and jobs may be preserved. Such prior dis-
cussion with a duly designated bargaining representative is all that
the Act contemplates. But it commands no less.1 4
Although the Town & Country decision was enforced by the Fifth
Circut,'" that court did not consider the question of economic mo-
tivation; therefore, the Board's dictum, as quoted above, has become
the basis of the controversial theory of the duty to bargain over
dectszons as opposed to effects.
Shortly after the Town & Country decision, the Board decided
to review the original Fibreboard Paper Prods. case.'" It applied
the Town & Country rationale and overturned its former decision.
In doing so, it stated the following: "As we stated in Town &
Country, 'it would be an exercise in futulity to attempt to remedy
this type of violation if an employer's decision to subcontract were
to stand. No genuine bargaining over a decision to terminate a
phase of operations can be conducted where that decision has al-
ready been made and implemented.""17
The Supreme Court decision, affirming the Fibreboard case, of
course, has far reaching effects. The majority of the Court stated
as follows:
The subject matter of the present dispute is well within the
literal meaning of the phrase "terms and conditions of employ-
ment. " A stipulation with respect to the contracting out of work
performed by members of the bargaining unit might appropriately
be called a "condition of employment." The words even more
plainly cover termination of employment which, as the facts of
this case indicate, necessarily results from the contracting out of
work performed by members of the established bargaining unit.is
The Court justified its conclusion on two basic premises: (1) bar-
gaining on the subject would contribute to industrial peace, and
14 Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027 (1962), enforced, 316
F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
15 Town & Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963)
16 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962)
17Id. at 555.
18 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964) (Cita-
tions omitted.)
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(2) subcontracting is commonly a subject of collective bargaining
in the United States. The Court stated in this regard:
The conclusion that "contracting out" is a statutory subject of
collective bargaining is further reinforced by industrial practices in
this country. While not determinative, it is appropriate to look to
industrial bargaining practices in appraising the propriety of in-
cluding a particular subject within the scope of mandatory bargain-
ing. Industrial experience is not only reflective of the interests
of labor and management in the subject matter but is also indica-
tive of the amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining
process. Experience illustrates that contracting out in one form
or another has been brought, widely and successfully, within the
collective bargaining framework. Provisions relating to contract-
ing out exist in numerous collective bargaining agreements, and
"contracting out work is the basis of many grievances; and that
type of claim is grist in the mills of the arbitrators."' 9
The Court, at the end of its decision attempted to soften its
impact by stating:
We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining
to hold, as we do now, that the type of "contracting oue' involved
in this case - the replacement of employees in the existing bar-
gaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do the
same work under similar conditions of employment - is a statu-
tory subject of collective bargaining under § 8(d) Our decision
need not and does not encompass other forms of "contracting out"
or "subcontracting" which arise daily in our complex economy.20
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas and Harlan, con-
curred in the majority decision of the Court but they were disturbed
by the implications emanating from the majority opinion. Justice
Stewart, therefore, attempted to explain what his interpretation of
the majority opinion was and perhaps, more importantly, what it
was not. In this regard he stated as follows:
The question posed is whether the particular decision sought to
be made unilaterally by the employer in this case is a subject of
mandatory collective bargaining within the statutory phrase "terms
and conditions of employment." That is all the Court decides.
The Court most assuredly does not decide that every managerial de-
cision which necessarily terminates an individual's employment is
subject to the duty to bargain. Nor does the Court decide that
subcontracting decisions are as a general matter subject to that
duty. The Court holds no more than that this employer's decision
to subcontract this work, involving "the replacement of employees
in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent con-
'9DId. at 211-12. (Citations omitted.)
2Od. at 215. (Citations omitted.)
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tractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employ-
ment," is subject to the duty to bargain collectively. Within the
narrow limitations implicit in the specific facts of this case, I
agree with the Court's decision.2 1
Justice Stewart, although agreeing with the Court's decision
in the particular case was obviously concerned about the far reach-
ing implications of the case. He stated:
While employment security has thus properly been recognized
in various circumstances as a condition of employment, it surely
does not follow that every decision which may affect job security
is a subject of compulsory collective bargaining. Many decisions
made by management affect the job security of employees. De-
cisions concerning the volume and kind of advertising expendi-
tures, product design, the manner of financing, and sales, all may
bear upon the security of the workers' jobs. Yet it is hardly con-
ceivable that such decisions so involve "conditions of employment"
that they must be negotiated with the employees' bargaining rep-
resentative.
In many of these areas the impact of a particular management
decision upon job security may be extremely indirect and uncer-
tam, and this alone may be sufficient reason to conclude that such
decisions are not "with respect to conditions of employment."
Yet there are other areas where decisions by management may
quite dearly imperil job security, or indeed terminate employment
entirely. An enterprise may decide to invest in labor saving ma-
chinery. Another may resolve to liquidate its assets and go out of
business. Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as
imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial
decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Deci-
sions concerning the commitment of investment capital and the
basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about
conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may
be necessarily to terminate employment. If, as I think clear, the
purpose of § 8(d) is to describe a limited area subject to the duty
of collective bargaining, those management decisions which are
fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or
which impinge only indirectly upon employment security should be
excluded from that area. 22
Therefore, the situation after the Supreme Court's affirmance
of the Fibreboard case was that contracting out was now a statutory
subject of collective bargaining despite the strong concurring
opinion which attempted to minimize the effect of the entire de-
cision. Although both the majority and the concurring Justices
attempted to limit the case to its facts in some way, it specifically
upheld the Board's authority in finding unfair labor practices in
such cases and, as a remedy, to restore the status quo ante, namely,
211d. at 218.
22Id. at 223.
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in the Fibreboard case, resumption of maintenance operations by
the company, and the rehiring of discharged employees with full
back pay. Moreover, the confusion of the Supreme Court's decision
m Fibreboard is heightened by a footnote to the decision which
indicated that "the terms 'contracting out' and 'subcontracting' have
no precise meaning. They are used to describe a variety of business
arrangements altogether different from that involved in this case."23
No matter how the Fibreboard decision is read, the suggestion
in the majority opinion and the direct statement in the concurring
opinion that other kinds of "contracting out" may not be mandatory
subjects of bargaining makes the exact scope of that decision un-
clear.
Prior to the Board's theory in Town & Country and Fibreboard
and the Supreme Court's affirmance of this theory - that certain
managerial decisions about changes in operations which affect em-
ployment cannot be made unilaterally but must be bargained about
with the union in advance of the decision - court and Board au-
thority was to the contrary, namely, bargaining must take place in
managerial decisions of this kind but only as to the effects on the
employees. In NLRB v. Rapu Bindery, Inc.,24 it was stated that
"the decision to move was not a required subject of collective bar-
gaming, as it was clearly within the realm of managerial discre-
tion."25 In Mahonzng Mining Co.,"0 the Board stated that it
"has never held that an employer may not in good faith
change his business structure, sell or contract out a portion of his
operations, or make any like change which might affect the con-
stituency of the appropriate unit without first consulting the bar-
gaming representative of the employees affected."27
Similarly in Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co.,2" it was held that the re-
fusal to negotiate with the union in regard to the transfer or re-
moval of operations from one plant to another of the same com-
pany did not constitute a section 8(a) (5) violation of the act. 9
It is, therefore, quite obvious that in the area of basic managerial
23 Id. at 215 n.8.
24293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
25 NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961).
26 61 N.L.R.B. 792 (1945).
2 7 Maho-,ng Mining Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 792, 803 (1945).
2834 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941).
29 Brown-McIaren MAfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941). See also Jays Foods, Inc. v.
NILRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961); Phillips v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 199 F. Supp.
589 (N.D. Ga. 1961); Krantz Wire & Mfg. Co., 97 N.LR.B. 971, other holdings en-
forced, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952).
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decisions (whether subcontracting, plant shutdown, or movement)
the Board, supported by certain courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court, is changing the basic collective bargaining process by re-
quiring employers to bargain in advance of making a decision in
a vital matter.
II. LEGAL RESULTS OF TOWN & COUNTRY THEORY
It is a short step to go from subcontracting to plant shutdown,
movement, or liquidation. The Board took this step shortly after
it enunciated its view in the second Fibreboard case. In Star Baby
Co.,"° the Board stated the following: "We accordingly find that
by unilaterally terminating their business operations without con-
sulting with the Union, the respondents further violated Section
8(a) (5) of the Act."'" Although the Star Baby case primarily
involved a section 8(a) (3) violation of the act, the position of
the Board was clear. Earlier, in Werngarten Food Center, Inc.,32
the company had sold five of its six stores in a particular area and
had terminated the employment of all of its employees in those
stores. The company did not bargain with the union about its de-
casion but did seek to discuss with the union its plans for granting
severance pay to the employees and for rehiring certain of them
in its sole remaining store. No unlawful refusal to bargain con-
cerning the decision to discontinue the operations was found be-
cause of the technicality that the General Counsel of the NLRB had
failed to argue this violation; but the decision is dear in that, if it
had not been for this technicality, the doctrine of failing to bargain
about a decision to go out of business would have been applicable
to the case and the Board would have found a section 8(a) (5)
violation.
In Mitchell Boat Co.,33 the trial examiner applied the new
theory (of bargaining over a decision to subcontract) to the shut-
down of an unprofitable plant for purely economic reasons, where
the company refused to negotiate over the effects of the shutdown
and the method of choosing employees for layoff. This decision
30 140 N.LR.B. 678 (1963), enforced as modified, 334 F.2d 601 (2d Cir.
1964) The court of appeals did not consider the § 8(a) (5) portion of the Board's
decision.
31 Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 678, 681 (1963), enforced as modified, 334
F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1964)
32 140 N.L.R.B. 256 (1962)
33 1964 CCH NLRB 5 12928.
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was affirmed by the Board when no exceptions were taken to the
trial examiner's decision.
In United Datry Co.," the trial examiner found, on the basis
of the Town & Country and Fibreboard decisions, that an employer
had violated section 8 (a) (5) by entering into a contract for the
sale of some of the existing plants which were admittedly unprofit-
able, without first affording the union an opportunity to bargain
with respect to such a decision. In reaching his decision, the trial
examiner stated: "I think that since sales, or mergers, or other
dispositions of facilities in our rapidly changing economy have such
an obvious, direct and often devastating impact on the jobs of em-
ployees they fall within the principle relied upon by the Board in
subcontracting cases." 5
In another case illustrative of the Board's feelings in this mat-
ter,36 it found a violation of section 8(a) (5) where the company
discontinued its cheese processing and packaging operation without
first notifying and bargaining with the union as statutory bargain-
Ing representative of its employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit. In Winn-Dzxze Stores, Inc.,1 the Board in affirming the trial
examiner stated:
An employer is under a duty to bargain with the chosen repre-
sentative of his employees concerning matters affecting their
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment and can-
not unilaterally change established employment conditions with-
out bargaining, regardless of the emstence or nonexistence of a
collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, in the instant case, the
Respondent was not justified in completely disregarding that duty
regardless of what may have appeared to it to be the economic
desirability of terminating the cheese packaging operation. The
Union had a statutory right to be notified in advance of the pro-
posed action and to be given an opportunity, if it so desired, to
consult and negotiate with the Respondent about the need for
elimination of unit jobs and the possibility of alternative ap-
proaches that might avoid such action. Failing other resolution,
the Union had a further right to bargain about steps that might
34 BNA 1963 DAILY LAB. REP. No. 107, at D-l, complant dismissed on pro-
cedural grounds, 146 N.L.R.B. 187 (1964). Because of the dismissal the trial
examiner's ruling on the merits was not considered.
35 Umted Dairy Co., 1964 CCH NLRB 5 12928.
36 Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 788 (1964), enforced, NLRB v. Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc, 53 CCH Lab. Cas. 5 11243 (5th Cir. 1966).
87 147 N.L.B. 788 (1964); accord, Apex Linen Serv., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 34
(1965), where it was held to be a § 8(a) (5) violation to close a plant for economic
reasons, without notifying the union and giving it an opportunity to bargain over the
decision.
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be taken to minim-,e the effects upon employees of the proposed
action.88
The above cases are merely illustrative of the Board's view of
the duty to bargain over mandatory subjects of collective bargain-
mng. It is apparent from those decisions and others which will be
discussed later, that the Board feels that there is a duty to bargain
over the dectszon to shut down a facility, to partially shut down a
facility, to move a facility, or to completely go out of business.
III. THE DARLINGTON CASE AND ITS EFFECTS
Although the case of Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co. 9
basically involved a question of a violation of section 8(a) (3)
(discrimination) in the area of going out of business, the language
of that decision has been used in subsequent section 8 (a) (5) cases
and must be analyzed. Darlington Manufacturing Company was
a South Carolina corporation operating one textile mill. A majority
of Darlington stock was held by Deering Millikin & Company
which marketed textiles produced by others. Deering Millikin
was controlled by Roger Millikin, President of Darlington, and by
other members of the Millikin family. It was found at the Board
hearing that the Millikin family, through Deering Millikm, oper-
ated seventeen textile manufacturing companies including Darling-
ton Manufacturing, whose products, manufactured in twenty-seven
different mills, were marketed through Deering Millikin. In March,
1956, the union initiated a successful organizational campaign at
the Darlington Company which culminated in an election won by
the union on September 6, 1956. Advised of the victory, Roger
Millikin met with the board of directors and told them that the
company could not possibly be competitive as a result of the union
victory. The board of directors subsequently met and voted to
liquidate the corporation. The plant ceased operations entirely in
November, 1956, and all plant machinery and equipment was sold
piecemeal at auction in December of that year.
The union filed section 8(a) (1), (3), and (5) charges against
the company. The Board found that the closing, because of anti-
union animus, was a violation of section 8(a) (3) of the act and
that the refusal to meet with the union to bargain regarding a new
collective bargaining agreement was a violation of section 8(a)
(5), especially in light of the fact that the plant closing was an
3SWinn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 788, 789 (1964).
a9380 U.S. 263 (1965)
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unfair labor practice. The case was appealed, and on review the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement That court
held that a company has the absolute right to dose out a part or
all of its business, regardless of anti-union motivation. The court
therefore did not even review the Board's finding that Deering
Millikm was a single-integrated employer. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the case and in its decision stated:
We hold that so far as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an
employer has the absolute right to termtnate his entire business
for any reason he pleases, but disagree with the Court of Appeals
that such right includes the ability to close part of a business no
matter what the reason.41
The Court went on to state that:
A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of
business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation
that it should not be entertained without the dearest manifestation
of legislative intent or unequvocal judicial precedent so constru-
ing the Labor Relations Act. We find neither.42
The Court answered, in the following manner, the AFL-CIO's con-
tention that the company's action was similar to a discriminatory
lockout in that it was designed to frustrate organizational efforts
to destroy or undermine bargaining representation:
The personal satisfaction that such an employer may derive from
standing on hIs beliefs or the mere possibility that other employers
will follow his example are surely too remote to be considered dan-
gers at which the labor statutes were aimed. Although employees
may be prohibited from engaging in a strike under certain condi-
tions, no one would consider it a violation of the Act for the same
employees to quit their employment en masse even if motivated
by a desire to ruin the employer. The very permanence of such
action would negate any future economic benefit to the employees.
The employer's right to go out of business is no different.
We are not presented here with the case of a "runaway shop"
whereby Darlington would transfer its work to another plant or
open a new plant in another locality to replace its dosed plant.
Nor are we concerned with a shutdown where the employees, by
renouncing the union, could cause the plant to reopen. Such cases
would involve discriminatory employer action for the purpose of
obtaining some benefit in the future from the new employees.
We hold here only that when an employer doses his entire busi-
40 Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963), vacated and re-
manded, 380 U.S. 263 (1965)
41 Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965). (Emphasis
added.)
421d. at 270.
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ness, even if the liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness towards
the union, such action is not an unfair labor practice.43
In discussing the partial dosing aspects of the case the Court
stated:
By analogy to those cases involving a continuing enterprise we are
constrained to hold, in disagreement with the Court of Appeals, that
a partial closing is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (3) if
motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any of the remain-
ing plants of the single employer and if the employer may reason-
ably have foreseen that such dosing will likely have that effect.44
The Court stated further:
If the persons exercising control over a plant being closed for
ant-union reasons (1) have an interest in another business,
whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the same line of com-
mercial activity as the dosed plant, of sufficient substantiality to
give promise of their reaping a benefit from the discouragement
of unionization in that business; (2) act to close their plant with
the purpose of producing such a result; and (3) occupy a relation-
ship to the other business which makes it realistically foreseeable
that its employees will fear that such business will also be dosed
down if they persist in organizational activities, we think that an
unfair labor practice has been made out. 5
On the basis of this reasoning the Court remanded the decision
to the Board for further hearings and decision to decide whether
or not the case at hand was a partial or entire dosing.
The discussion of Darlington is necessary due to the fact that
it is possible that the courts and the Board and some employers feel
that it deals with the duty to bargain as well as discriminatory shut-
down of a plant. However, the Supreme Court, in a footnote, stated
that "such a finding [8(a) (5) violation] was in part based on the
determination that the plant closing was an unfair labor practice,
and no argument is made that section 8(a) (5) requires an em-
ployer to bargain concerning a purely business decision to terminate
his enterprise. Cf. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v Labor
Board."4"
43ld. at 272-74. (Citations omitted.)
44 Id. at 275.
45 Id. at 275-76.
46 Id. at 267 n.5. Even in the light of the Supreme Court's statement in regard
to the independent § 8(a) (5) aspects of the Darlington case, it can be argued that
the logical application of the Darlington doctrine, that an employer has the "abso-
lute right to terminate his entire business," means that there is no duty to bargain
over the dectston to do so. It seems that such a conclusion does not necessarily
follow, and that there certainly can be no such position supported in cases involving
relocation (partial or total), subcontracting, or closing of a portion of a business
enterprise (whether multi-plant or not).
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It is interesting to note that the Darlington case, which basically
only dealt with discriminatory activity under section 8 (a) (3) of
the act has already been used in section 8(a) (5) managerial
decision cases. In NLRB v Adams Datry, Inc., the Eighth Circuit
for the second tme refused to enforce a Board order of a section
8(a) (5) violation in regard to a subcontracting situation. In the
case the court relied, in part, upon the Darlington language. The
case is essential to a discussion of the duty to bargain over mana-
gerial decisions, even though it involves subcontracting, because
it is the second time that the Eighth Circuit has refused to accept
the Board's duty-to-bargain theory about a managerial decision.
Moreover, the Adams Datry case is important due to the fact that
it involves a managerial decision during the term of a collective
bargaining agreement.
The company had entered into a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the union to become effective September 1, 1959, and
this contract was not to expire until September 1, 1962. The 1959
contract was the third between the parties since negotiations began
in 1954. During the negotiations for all three of the collective
bargaining agreements, the union had attempted to include a clause
which would have prevented Adams Dairy from selling employees'
routes or parts thereof to independent contractors. During the 1959
negotiations the company expressed concern over the fact that rival
companies had lower delivery costs and were able to undersell
Adams. The union again proposed the inclusion of a clause in the
contract prohibiting further substitution of independent contractors
on company routes, but the proposal was again rejected by the
company.
During November and December of 1959, the company initi-
ated a series of meetings with the union for the purpose of discuss-
ing the unfavorable competitive situation in which it found itself
due to lower delivery costs of other dairies. The company asked
the union for recommendations that it might have with regard to
lower delivery costs but the union expressed its inability to help.
In February of 1960, the company made a decision to terminate a
phase of its business and distribute all of its products through in-
dependent contractors rather than driver-salesmen represented by
the union. Upon those facts the Board found a violation of
section 8(a) (5) of the act.48 When the company refused to com-
47350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denwd, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
48 Adanms Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.B3. 815 (1962).
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ply with the Board's decision the NLRB petitioned the court of
appeals for enforcement. In NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc.,." the
Eighth Circuit held that the decision of the company, on economic
grounds, to terminate a portion of its operations was not a required
subject of collective bargaining under the act and that, therefore,
the company had not violated section 8(a) (5) of the act by dis-
continuing its operation without first notifying and consulting with
the union. The court held that on the issue of whether the com-
pany violated the act in its discontinuance of a phase of its opera-
tions, the Board was not correct in ignoring the question of intent.
The Board could not find an unfair labor practice without "first
finding some illegal motivation or intent or discriminatory result
that naturally followed therefrom."5  The court then went back
to the pre-Town & Country decisions and found only that the com-
pany must bargain about the effects of this discontinuance but that
there was no necessity to bargain concerning the actual decision."
After the Eighth Circuit Court's opinion, the General Counsel
49322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963)
59NLRB v. Adams Dary, Inc., 322 F.2d 553, 559 (8th Cir. 1963)
51 It is interesting to note that the Eighth Circuit in stating that there could be
no unfair labor practice without intent seemed to be ignoring the prior decisions
in regard to § 8(a) (5) of the act and was relying on discriminatory motivation
cases under § 8(a) (3) of the act.
Under the original Adams Dairy decision the trial examiner, Arnold Ordman
(who is now the NLRB General Counsel) made some disturbing statements. Sec-
tion 8(d) of the act provides in part that "where there is in effect a collective bar-
gaining contract covering employees, the duty to bargain collectively [as set forth
in § 8(a) (5)) shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or
modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modificaton"
serves written notice sixty days prior to the expiration date of that contract "and
continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such
nonce is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later."
Trial Examiner Ordman found that the employer had violated § 8 (d) and derivatively
§ 8(a) (5) by its unilateral act Ordman reasoned as follows:
By eliminating both the work which was the subject matter of the
collective-bargaining contract and the employees who performed that work,
Respondent in the most real sense terminated that contract since there was
no area left in which it could be operative. Without more, therefore, it
appears that Respondent's failure to follow the procedure prescribed by sec-
tion 8(d) as a precondition to such termination constitutes a violation of
section 8(a) (5). I so find. 137 N.L.R.B. 815, 825 (1961)
While this conclusion was not affirmed by the Board (it found it unnecessary to
pass thereon) the fact that the General Counsel favors such an interpretation of the
act is in itself significant. If this interpretation is adopted by the Board, the neces-
sary effect will be to deny the employer the right to shut down or subcontract an entire
operation during the contract term unless such a move is consented to by the union
which represents its employees. Furthermore, if this rationale is adopted, it is not un-
likely that the Board would expand its scope to cover the case of a partial shutdown or
move.
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of the NLRB petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
and on January 18, 1965, the petition was granted, the prior judg-
ment of the Eighth Circuit was vacated, and the case was remanded
to that Circuit for reconsideration in the light of the Supreme Court
decision in Fibreboard.'
This, of course, brings us to the present Adams Dairy decision
of the Eighth Circuit.5" In the light of the Fibreboard case the
Eighth Circuit, nevertheless, upheld the company's right to unilat-
erally discontinue its operation. The Eighth Circuit, in effect, stated
that since the Supreme Court decision in Fibreboard was expressly
limited to its own facts the Adams Dairy situation could be dis-
tinguished and, relying upon the concurring opinion in Fibreboard,
upheld the company. The Eighth Circuit distinguished Fibreboard
on the following bases. In Fibreboard the contracting out did not
change the basic operation of the company since the contractor per-
formed the same work on the company's premises with the same
machinery and equipment under the direct control of the company
with the company directly enjoying the benefits of the contractor's
work. The court pointed out that in the Adams situation, a basic
operational change had occurred when it decided to change its ex-
isting distribution system by selling its products to independent
contractors. After the decision was made, all the trucks used pre-
viously by driver-salesmen were sold to independent distributors.
Adams Dairy did not finance the sale, nor did it arrange for such
financing, and the routes driven by the independent contractors did
not correspond to the previous routes of the driver-salesmen. Inde-
pendent distributors took control of the products at dock-side and
Adams legally had no concern with what was done with the prod-
ucts. Distributors were solely responsible for selling the product.
The work done by the independent contractors was not primarily
performed in the Adams plant for the benefit of the dairy and,
finally, Adams was not directly concerned with whether the distribu-
tor sustained a profit or a loss.
In reaching its conclusion regarding this change the court stated:
Contrary to the situation in Fibreboard, then, there is more
involved in Adams Dairy than just the substituuon of one set of
employees for another. In Adams Dairy there is a change in basic
operating procedure in that the dairy liqudated that part of its
business handling distribution of milk products. Unlike the situa-
5 2 NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 379 U.S. 644 (1965) (per cauram).
53 NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1011 (1966).
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ton in Fibreboard, there was a change in the capital structure of
Adams Dairy which resulted in a partial liquidation and a recoup
of capital investment. To requre Adams to bargain about its
decision to close out the distribution end of its business would sig-
nificantly abridge its freedom to manage its own affairs. Bargain-
ing is not contemplated in this area under the history and usage
of section 8(a) (5) 54
The court did not stop at this point. It still felt the necessity
of discussing anti-union animus in order to find a section 8(a) (5 )
violation. In this respect, the following language from the Su-
preme Court decision in the Darlington case was quoted: "A partial
dosing is an unfair labor practice under § 8 (a) (3) if motivated by
a purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining plants of the
single employer and if the employer may reasonably have foreseen
that such closing would likely have that effect."5 5 The court seized
upon the above quotation in concluding that since there was no
ant-union anmus in the Adams Datry situation the company did
not violate the act by refusing to bargain about a partial closing of
its operation.5 6
The Eighth Circuit, then, in effect is saying that in order for
there to be a section 8(a) (5) violation of a management decision
to terminate a portion of its operations it is necessary first to have
anti-union animus. This is based upon its original decision and
upon the language of the Darlington case. It is submitted that the
Adams Dairy court in relying on the necessity of anti-union animus
and the Darlington case has misinterpreted and misread the law
in this respect. There is no requirement that there be ant-union
animus in order to find a refusal to bargain under section 8(a) (5)
of the act." In holding that Adams Datry did not violate the
act, it appears, that the Eighth Circuit relied upon the concurring
opinion in the Fibreboard case, which concurring opinion was
mainly concerned with explaining the Court's decision (if that could
be done), the concept of anti-union animus, and a Supreme Court
decision dealing mainly with a section 8 (a) (3) violation.
The Eighth Circuit is not the only court that is interpreting
the section 8(a) (5) obligation in this way In NLRB v. Royal
Platng & Polishing Co.,s the Third Circuit reversed a Board
finding that an employer had violated section 8(a) (5) of the act.
54Id. at 111. (Citations omitted.)
55Id. at 112.
56Id. at 113.
57 Cf. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
58 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965)
1236
DECISIONS TO CHANGE OPERATIONS
In that case the employer unilaterally began negotiations for the
sale of his facilities at the same time as he was engaged in collective
bargaining negotiations with the union representing his employees.
While negotiations with the union continued, the employer pro-
ceeded to grant an irrevocable ninety-day option to purchase his
property to the city housing authority; several weeks after the union
contract was executed (after a one week strike) the employer -and
the housing authority reached agreement on the terms of sale and
the employer conveyed his title to the property, retaining, how-
ever, a six-month lease. Shortly thereafter, the employer announced
for the first time that he had sold the plant and would cease opera-
tions; this was in fact done several weeks thereafter and all the
employees were laid off. All the machinery and equipment was
sold at public auction. On the basis of those facts the Board held
that the employer had violated section 8(a) (5) of the act by failing
to notify the union and failing to afford it "an opportunity if it
desired, to consult and negotiate with [the employer] about the con-
templated action and the possibility of alternative approaches that
might avoid such action."5 The Board also stated:
As we have emphasized before, seemingly, unsolvable problems,
can, upon occasion, be solved if the parties to a bargaining re-
lationship confront each other honestly and openly across the bar-
gaming table with their respective problems and positions
It is not necessary that a satisfactory solution to the serious issues
involved in a closedown of operations be the probable result of
bargaining negotiations for the obligation to give notice and op-
portunity for discussion of such matter to be a viable and intrinsic
part of the statutory bargaining obligation.60
The Third Circuit reversed the Board's decision as well as its
approach to the matter. The court pointed out that the question
involved in the case was whether a partial termination of opera-
tions is a mandatory subject of bargaining under the act. In an-
swer to that question the court stated that "an employer faced with
the economic necessity of either moving or consolidating the opera-
tions of a failing business has no duty to bargain with the union
respecting its decision to shut down."'61 In reaching this decision
the court relied upon the Supreme Court's concurring opinion set
forth in the Fibreboard case and that Court's opinion in the Darling-
59 Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 N.LR.B. 545, 547 (1964), vacated, 350
F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
6oIld.
61NLM3 v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965).
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ton case. 2 The court then went on to remand the case back to the
Board to determine whether the company violated the act in refus-
ing to bargain over the effects of the shutdown as opposed to actual
decision. Just recently the Board decided the case on remand find-
ing that the company did in fact fail to bargain over the effects of
the sale."
It is interesting to note at this point that the NLRB has refused
to accept the rationale of Darlington in section 8 (a) (5) decisions.
In Carmichael Floor Covering Co., 4 the Board found that an em-
ployer had violated the act by unilaterally contracting out certain
work that had been performed by the employees represented by the
union. The argument was made that the situation was controlled
by the rationale of the Darlington case. In response to this argu-
ment the Board stated:
Respondents rely upon a statement by the Court in that case [Dar-
lington Mfg. Co.] to the effect that a partial closing of an employ-
ers business will not be an unfair labor practice unless found to
be "motivated by a purpose to chill unionism." Respondents' re-
liance upon the rationale of Darlington is misplaced. In Darling-
ton the Court was concerned with an issue of discriminatory mo-
tivation and its application, if any, to a complete or a partial clos-
ing of a plant. The charge in the instant case, however, relates
solely to respondent's statutory duty to bargain. The alleged vio-
lation concerns the consequences of their failure to fulfill such
duty regardless of the existence of any discriminatory motivation.6 5
It is submitted that the Board is correct in this instance of re-
jecting the Darlington reasoning in dealing with section 8(a) (5)
cases. That is not to say that managerial decisions to partially
dose a plant or move a plant or completely go out of business are
so dearly mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. It is merely
to state that relying on the language of the concurring opinion in
Fibreboard or the final decision in Darlington is not the proper way
of approaching the problem.
IV. WHEN THE DuTy TO BARGAIN ARISES
Whether in the area of subcontracting, wherein most of the
significant decisions lie, or in the area of plant closing, move-
62 See NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 346 F.2d 897 (8th
Cir. 1965).63 Royal Plaung & Polishing Co., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 72, BNA 1966 DAILY IAB.
REP. No. 178, at D-1 (Sept. 13, 1966)
6460 L.R.R.M. 1364 (NLRB 1965).
65 Carnuchael Floor Covering Co., 60 L.R.R.M. 1364, 1366 (NLRB 1965).
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ment, or similar significant management decisions, the NILRB seems
to be applying a "significant detriment" test in determining whether
employer unilateral action is violative of section 8(a) (5) of the act.
In some respects it appears that the Board is backing off the hard
line that it took shortly after the original Town & Country and
Fibreboard decisions were handed down. For example, in Westing-
house FNec. Corp,66 the Board in upholding an employer's unilateral
decision to subcontract where no employees were laid off stated:
Our decisions in this area make it dear that Fibreboard was
not intended to lay down a hard and fast rule as to unilateral sub-
contracting and that even where a subject of mandatory bargaining
is involved, there may be circumstances which the Board would
accept as justifying unilateral action. Thus, as we have recently
pointed out, an employer's obligation to give prior notice and an
opportunity to bargain concerning particular instances of sub-
contracting does not normally arise unless the sub-contracting will
effect some change in the terms and conditions of employment
of the employees involved. Consistent with this view, the Board
has refused to find a violation of section 8(a) (5) where the em-
ployer's allegedly unlawful unilateral action resulted in no "sigm-
ficant detriment" to employees in the appropriate uit.67
The problem is, of course, in determining what constitutes a
"significant detriment." In the following circumstances involving
subcontracting, the Board has ruled that there was no "significant
detriment". (1) loss of some Saturday overtime;6" (2) the fact that
laid-off employees could have performed the work contracted out;69
and (3) the fact that laborers were precluded from performing
certain work at craft rates.7"
Where, however, the unilateral action results in the immediate
loss of bargaining unit jobs, it seems that the Board will require
bargaining over the decision. Thus in Weston & Brooker Co.,7
the Board held that the laying off of one employee due to a subcon-
tract constituted a "significant detriment," noting that "respondent's
decision had a demonstrably adverse impact on the job tenor of at
least one unit employee."7'
6659 L.R.R.M. 1355 (NLRB 1965).
67 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 59 LR-.R.. 1355, 1357 (NLRB 1965).
68 General Tube Co., 151 N.LLB. No. 89 (1965). But see Cities Serv. Oil Co.,
158 N.LR.B. No. 120 (1966), where the loss of $8 per week in overtime pay was
considered a "significant detriment."
69 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 59 L.R.P . 1355 (NLRB 1965).
7OAmencan Oil Co., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (1965).
7160 L.R.R.M. 1015 (NLRB 1965).
72 Weston & Brooker Co., 60 L.R..M. 1015, 1017 (NLRB 1965).
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It is obvious that in decisions not involving subcontracts but
involving more significant determinations, such as plant removal,
plant closing, or partial plant dosing or removal, a "significant
detriment" exists.
V SATISFYING THE DuTY TO BARGAIN
Beginning with the original Adams Datry decision73 by the
Board, the question of satisfaction of the duty to bargain in cases
of this type has been a burning issue. In that case the employer
based its defense, in part, upon the claim that it had bargained
during contract negotiations over the issue of subcontracting and
that it had, therefore, satisfied its obligations as set forth in the act.
Although the Board conceded that the evidence showed that the
parties had discussed at length, in negotiations, the employer's
right to subcontract and also that the union had attempted to in-
dude in the contract a clause which would limit that right but
was unsuccessful, nevertheless, it rejected the employer's defense.
Its rejection was based upon the fact that the parties to the con-
tract had never bargained seriously over the activites actually en-
gaged in by the employer, namely, the farming out of all of the
bargaining unit work. The Board stated that "inasmuch as Re-
spondent had never proposed to the Union the complete abolition
of its driver-salesmen operation and the replacement of its driver-
salesmen by independent distributors, the Union cannot be found
either to have agreed with that proposal or to have waived its ob-
jections in that regard."'74
The position adopted by the Board in that Adams Datry de-
cision appears to be in accord with its well-established rule that in
order for an employer to justify unilateral changes in working con-
ditions during the term of a contract it must demonstrate that the
union has "dearly and unmistakably waived or bargained away
its statutory rights to bargaining" with respect to such changes.75
Phrased differently, the Board has specifically stated that an em-
ployer violates section 8 (a) (5) if he unilaterally mstitutes changes
in working conditions during the term of the contract without af-
fording the union an opportunity to bargain thereon, "unless it
can be said from an evaluation of the prior negotiations that the
matter was 'fully discussed' or 'consciously explored' and the union
73 Adams Daity, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1961)
74 Id. at 824.
75 Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953, 956 (1958).
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'consciously yielded' or 'dearly and unmistakably waived' its interest
in the matter."76
In the case of Shell Oil Co.,77 the Board's position on unilateral
changes during the term of a contract, and the company's satisfac-
tion of the duty to bargain as evidenced by the contract was
further set forth. In that case there was no question that subcon-
tracting was the major issue during negotiations preceding the
execution of the parties' agreement. The agreement, like those
which the parties had adhered to for approximately ten years be-
fore, contained a clause which provided that in the event the em-
ployer subcontracts work "'which could be performed by employees
covered by this agreement, the company will. [require] the con-
tractor to pay not less than the rates of pay provided in this agree-
ment for the same character of work."'"" In the latest negotiations
prior to the agreement, the union had sought provisions which
would limit the company's right to subcontract. These proposals
were rejected by the company and the contract, as signed, contained
no such limitations. Further, the Board found that the company had
for some time engaged in subcontracting of "occasional maintenance
work" which employees could and normally would perform. The
Board found that the contract as signed "evidenced a contractual in-
tent that, except for the limitation on subcontractors' wage rates
[the company] was free to award occasional maintenance subcon-
tracts without obligation to provide advance notice or an opportu-
nity to bargain."79 The disturbing aspect in the Board's decision is
the fact that it only held that "occasional maintenance work" could,
under the Shell agreement, be unilaterally subcontracted. The de-
scriptive phrase "occasional maintenance work" was emphasized
throughout the opinion, and the Board made it very dear that it
was upholding only the employer's right to "continue" the unilateral
subcontracting of work properly classified as "occasional mainte-
nance." Furthermore, the Board gave an explicit caveat: "We wish
to make it dear that our present holding is limited to the particular
circumstances of this case and that we do not pass upon whether or
not . [the company] may, in the future, lawfully expand its sub-
contracting practice without prior notice and consultation with the
76The Press Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 976, 978 (1958); see also Proctor Wg. Corp.,
131 N.L.RB. 1166 (1961); Tide Water Assocaated Oil Co., 85 N.LR.B. 1096 (1949).
7 149 N.L.R-B. 283 (1964).
78 Sheli Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 283, 284 (1964).
791d. at 287
19661 1241
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [VoL 17" 1221
Union.""0 As noted above, the subcontracting clause in the agree-
ment made no reference to "occasional maintenance work," nor did
it contain any limitation upon the scope or nature of the work which
could be subcontracted. In the light of this circumstance, it is sig-
nificant that the Board chose to carefully limit its holding to "occa-
sional maintenance work."
Therefore, from a reading of the Adams Dazry decision and
the Shell Oil decision it was dear at that time, that the Board would
scrutinize contractual provisions most carefully and that only ex-
plicit waiver of the type of action contemplated would satisfy the
employer's duty to bargain (or waive the union's right to bargain).
The question then presented to employers was whether or not
it was necessary, in decisions of the nature of permanent cessa-
tion of operations or plant removal or subcontracting or other
such serious management decisions, to bargain to "impasse" before
a unilateral action could be taken.
Recent cases, however, seem to be more concerned with the
"significant detriment" test than with the impasse theory and the
Board seems to have established two different sets of rules to govern
what constitutes good faith bargaining. For example, where the
employer's unilateral action does not affect the size or scope of the
enterprise, but rather affects the terms of existing employment, the
Board is placing a strict bargaining duty upon the employer.
In the Board's decision in Westnghouse Elec. Corp.,"' where a one
cent increase in the price of coffee supplied by a private caterer was
deemed to be a mandatory subject of bargaining, the Board found a
section 8(a) (5) violation. On the other hand recent decisions in
the area of basic managerial decisions having an effect on em-
ployment have been subjected to the "significant detriment" test.
It seems that if it is determined by the Board that the decision in
question does not have a "significant detriment" the Board rules
that there is no obligation to bargain."
Where the duty to bargain exists, recent cases indicate that
there are various ways to satisfy it or even to be "excused" from
it. Moreover, it seems that waiver of the right to bargain by the
union can take place more easily. In Edward Axel Roffman Asso-
czates, Inc.,8 the Board held that the employer had given the union
80 Id. at 289-90.
81 156 N.L.R.B. No. 96 (1966)
8 2 Westunghouse Elec. Corp., 59 L.R.R.M. 1355 (NLRB 1965)
83 147 N.L.R.B. 717 (1964)
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sufficient notice and time to negotiate the decision to move the
plant under the following facts. In February of 1963, the em-
ployer made inquiries to local banks for financing the building
of a new plant. In March, the union inquired as to the truth of
rumors heard about the plant moving; the employer acknowledged
that it was looking for space elsewhere but merely for expansion
purposes. In April the employer leased a temporary location else-
where and began hiring employees. In a letter dated May 27 the
employer notified the union that it was contemplating the moving
of the plant, but it was not now committed to such move. The
company offered to initiate bargaining with the union concerning
the contemplated move. The union ignored the letter and the
employer sent another letter terminating the agreement which
would expire August 31 and told the union that a final decision
on the plant's move would have to be made within two weeks. On
July 1 the parties met for the last time and on August 31 the em-
ployer ceased operations at its present location.
In Internatunal Shoe Co., 4 the Board "excused" the company
from bargaining over the movement of work from one plant of the
company to another and relied partially on the management rights
clause (and an arbitrator's prior interpretation of it) which reserved
to management the right to "decide methods of selling and distribut-
ing products." The Board did not treat the language as constituting
a waiver but rather as an excuse.
The Board did find an express waiver, however, in Ador Corp.5
The clause the Board accepted as a waiver read as follows:
The management of the Company's plant and the direction of
its working forces, including the right to establish new jobs,
abolish or change existing jobs, increase or decrease the number
of jobs, change materials, processes, products, eqiupment and op-
erations shall be vested exclusively in the Company Subject
to the provision of this agreement, the Company shall have the
right to lay off employees because of lack of work or other
legitimate reasons.88
The company discontinued production of one of its products because
it was economically unfeasible to continue. The discontinuance
resulted in the instant layoff of four employees and the later
layoff of ten employees who worked on production of orders al-
ready accepted prior to the implementation of the company's de-
84151 N.LPRB. No. 78 (1965).
85 58 L.tR.R. 1280 (NLRB 1965).
86Ador Corp., 58 LR.R.M. 1280, 1281 (NiR.B 1965).
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cision to discontinue the line. In relying upon the management
rights clause for decision, the Board stated:
The so called management rights section of the collective-
bargaining contract in effect at the time Reinhard made his de-
cision and took the basic steps in the implementation thereof,
gave to the Company the exclusive right to eliminate production
of any of its products and to layoff employees who were, as a
consequence of such decision, no longer needed.87
A most interesting case in this area of management's satisfac-
tion of its duty to bargain in these areas is the New York Mirror
case."8 In that case the company terminated operations for eco-
nomic reasons without prior notification to the union. The termi-
nation was accomplished in the face of an existing collective bar-
gaining agreement which, iter alia, contained provisions for ter-
mination pay "in the event of permanent suspension" by the news-
paper. The contract also contained a "zipper" clause which read
as follows: "The parties hereto agree that they have fully bar-
gained with respect to terms [wages, hours] and conditions of em-
ployment and have settled the same for the terms of this agreement
in accordance with the terms thereof."8 9
The trial examiner held that the decision to suspend opera-
tions "was not a mandatory" subject for bargaining. His decision
was based on the finding that by executing the agreement contain-
ing the termination pay and "zipper" provision, the union waived
the right to bargain in advance of such a decision. The Board up-
held the trial examiner's decision but specifically rejected his
findings with respect to the effect of the above mentioned clauses.
The Board stated:
Turning to the issue of waiver, we, of course, recognize that the
statutory right of a union to bargain about changes in terms and
conditions of employment may be waived by the union. How-
ever, a waiver of a statutory right is not to be lightly inferred but
must be "dear and unmistakable." The Board will not find that
contract terms of themselves confer on the employer a manage-
ment right to take unilateral action on a mandatory subject of
87 1b4. See Druwhit Metal Prods. Co., 153 N.L.R1B. No. 35 (1965), where
the Board found, under a similar management rights clause, that the union had "ef-
fectively waived [its] right to bargain over the decision to discontinue a phase
of the Company's operation." See also General Motors Co., 149 N.LR.B. No. 40
(1964), remanded, UAW v. NLRB, 52 CCH Lab. Cas. 5 16681 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
afld on rehearsng, 158 N.LR.B. No. 24 (1966); Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 26
(1964) Compare Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1965)
8858 L.R.R.M. 1465 (NLRB 1965)
89New York Mirror, 58 L.RR.M. 1465, 1466 (NLRB 1965)
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bargaining unless the contract expressly or by necessary implica-
tion confers such a right °
In explaining what is meant by "necessary ,mplication" the
Board stated:
We agree with the respondent that in determining the parties'
actual contractual intent we are not restricted to the contract pro-
visions themselves but may properly evaluate them against the
lucidating background of their bargaining history.
Thus, for example, if it were to appear that after full explora-
tion of the subject during prior negotiations the unions had con-
sciously yielded their interest to be notified about the permanent
suspension of the Mirror's operations in return for the severance
of termination provisions, a finding of a dear and unmistakable
waiver might well be justified.91
The Board found that "on the specific waiver issue with which we
are here concerned, the severance and termination provisions are at
best equivocal" because they "contain no specific reference to a
right . to terminate operations without prior notice or consulta-
tion" with the union.92
After the Board stated that the union did not waive its statutory
right, it then "excused" the unilateral action of shutting down the
paper under the- guise of following the Supreme Court's statement
in NLRB v. Katz9" that "there might be circumstances which the
Board could or should accept as excusing or justifying unilateral ac-
tion." 94  The Board relied upon the following circumstances in
this regard: (1) press of economic necessity; (2) a long and effective
bargaining relationship pursuant to which the company. and union
had reached contractual settlement of the employees' severance pay
and termination rights; (3) the employer had bargained over the
effect of the shutdown and had cooperated in efforts to find the
laid-off employees other employment; and (4) no evidence of anti-
union animus. Accordingly, the Board held that "effectuation of
the purposes of the Act would not require a remedial order even
if a technical violation were found."95
Only confusion develops when one attempts to understand the
Board's "waiver" concept in the light of New York Mirror on
90 1d. at 1467.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibsd.
93 369 U.S. 736 (1962)
94 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962)
95New York Mirror, 58 L.R.R.M. 1465 (NLRB 1965)
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the one hand, and Ador and Druwhit Metal Prods. Co." on the
other.
To further confuse the matter as to what is an employer's and
union's duty to bargain in these areas is the very recent case of
Cumberland Shoe Corp. 7  In that case the employer operated two
plants. The Board's opinion noted that the employer had deter-
m ned in March, 1964, that one of the plants had to be dosed due
to financial losses and that on March 11 it communicated with
the union and arranged a conference for the following day. At
that conference the union was asked for suggestions, and in re-
sponse to its question was told that a wage cut would not prevent
dosing. The employer said that it would try to re-employ as many
of the laid-off employees as possible at its other plant. On April 1,
1964, the plant was dosed. At the date of the first hearing, forty-
one employees had been transferred to the remaining plant, but
approximately one hundred others had been terminated. Upon
these facts the Board stated that "the Respondent [Companyl did in
fact give the union adequate notice and an opportunity to discuss
all relevant matters, and hence that it bargained in good faith con-
cerning the dosing."" From a reading of the Cumberland Shoe de-
cision apparently all that is necessary in the area of plant shutdown
is notice to the union and an opportunity to discuss the employer's
decision; in that case, it seems that when the meeting was held with
the union, the decision to dose had already been made. If the em-
ployer meets these requisites, it can thereafter act unilaterally even
though a bargaining impasse in the conventional sense of the word
has not been met. To be safe, however, it seems that the decision
should remain tentative until notice and an opportunity to bargain
are given.
In another recent case, the Board's apparent lack of clarity in
regard to the duty to bargain over managerial decisions is high-
lighted. In Young Motor Truck Serv., Inc.,99 the Board upheld
the trial examiner's decision finding that the company had not vio-
lated section 8(a) (5) of the act in the actual sale and shutdown of
a trucking terminal. The trial examiner in his decision clearly
distinguished between subcontracting and the sale of the business
or a portion thereof. In his decision the examiner reasoned that
96 153 N.LR.B. No. 35 (1965) See cases cited note 87 supra.
97 1966 CCH NLRB 5 20173 (Jan. 26, 1966)
9 8 Cumberland Shoe Corp., 1966 CCH NLRB 5 20173, at 25385 (Jan. 26, 1966)
99 61 L.R.R.M. 1099 (NLRB 1966)
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subcontracting "affects the union's designation and status as bargain-
ing agent, because, the work of the unit for which the union has
been selected as such bargaining agent is still being performed for
the employer who is lawfully bound to recognize and bargain with
the union."' 0 On the other hand the examiner likened the sale of
the business to the sale of "a product or services," because "the pur-
chaser is not performing on behalf of the employer any of such em-
ployer's work any more than a purchaser of an employer's products
may be said to be performing the employer's work-" Following this
analogy he concluded that "since an employer need not negotiate
with the collective bargaining agent concerning the sale of merchan-
dise or services which he produces or offers, he need not bargain or
negotiate respecting the disposing of his production processes, so
long as such position is not tainted by desire to disparage or under-
mine the collective bargaining agent."'' The trial examiner did
in the case, however, note a distinction between the sale of a business
and the relocation of facilities. Both were involved in the case. Be-
cause the facilities were relocated only five miles from the previous
location, however, and because employees apparently were trans-
ferred without difficulty, he found that the relocation under these
circumstances was purely a matter of management prerogative, but
that the company would have to continue dealing with the incum-
bent bargaining representative.
Although the Board upheld the trial examiner's ultimate find-
ings and conclusions that the company did not violate the act by
refusing to bargain with the union over the decision to sell part of
its operation and dose down a trucking facility, the decision is
based on the fact that the union in fact waived its right to bargain.
The Board found that the union was advised of the impending ac-
tion but made no request to bargain about it. The Board, how-
ever, stated that it could not go along with the trial examiner's
reasoning in "certain erroneous interpretations of the Act, such as
that Section 8(a) (5) does not impose any obligation on an em-
ployer to refrain from unilateral action with respect to a proposed
sale or transfer of ins business."' 02
It is submitted that this statement is somewhat in conflict with
-10 BNA 1964 DAILY LAB. REP. No. 139, at A-3 (July 17, 1964).
10 1 Ibd.
102Young Motor Truck Serv., Inc., 61 LLRLM. 1099, 1100 (NLRB 1966) See
also Ilfeld Hardware & Furniture Co., 157 N.LR.B. No. 115 (1966).
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the Cumberland Shoe holding since in that case it appears that the
decision had been made when the first notice was given.
The Board has, in the past year or so, indicated that the
employer's statutory obligation to bargain about mandatory subjects
may be satisfied by the following alternatives: (1) giving notice
of the possible unilateral action and offering to sit down and dis-
cuss with the union;0 3 (2) if an express waiver of the union's statu-
tory right is contained in the collective bargaining agreement;' (3)
if the contractual intent of the parties "necessarily implies" that
such right has been waived as, for example, by the presence of a
strong management rights provision;"0 5 or (4) if all the surrounding
circumstances such as motive, past bargaining relationship, and will-
ingness to bargain after unilateral action indicates that the employer
was "excused" or "justified" for not bargaining on the mandatory
subject.' There is still no clear cut duty set forth by the Board
or the courts. Obviously, both management and unions do not
know the duty as yet. For example, in a recent article,0 7 Rudolph
Oswald, AFL-CIO economist, stated that plant closings and other
major changes affecting employers are not spur-of-the-moment de-
cisions by management, and unions need more lead tme to nego-
uate in advance of such matters.' 8 Oswald states that the usual
clause in a collective bargaining agreement requiring one or two
weeks' notce of layoff is not sufficient to meet the serious layoff
problem created by basic managerial decisions. "' Oswald in effect
is proposing that a union should have at least one year's advance
notice of layoffs of employees as a result of plant closings, mergers,
subcontracting, or major technological changes.
VI. SOME PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS
Although it appears that there is a "softening" in the Board's
approach and that it is possible that contract language and prior
negotiating history can help a company and a union in regard to the
'
03 Cumberland Shoe Corp., 1966 CCH NIRB 5 20173 (Jan. 26, 1966); Edward
Axel Roffman Associates, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 717 (1964)
104 Ador Corp., 58 L.R.R.M. 1280 (NLRB 1965)
105 lbut., New York Mirror, 58 LR.R.M. 1465 (NLRB 1965)
106 Ibtu.
10 7 AFL-CIO AmnicAN FEDERATONIST passtm (December, 1965) See also re-
port of speech by Malcolm L. Denise of Ford Motor Company warning of the dangers
of allowing all business decisions that affect employees to become subjects for collective
bargaining. BNA 1966 DAILY LAB. REP. No. 173, at AA-1 (Sept. 6, 1966).
108 Ibid.
109 Ibd.
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duty to bargain, it should be emphasized that this prior negotiation
history and the language in the agreement can be extremely relevant
to the problem of satisfaction of the duty to bargain. In short, the
questions of whether or not the parties have "fully discussed or con-
sciously explored" the issue of plant relocation, of plant shutdown,
or other major managerial decisions and whether or not the union
consciously yielded its interest in the matter would necessarily in-
volve a determination as to whether such issues were considered
during contract negotiations. If, for example, the facts show that
the union at one time proposed clauses which would prevent such
management moves and subsequently dropped its demands, an argu-
ment might be made that the union did in fact concede to the com-
pany its right to relocate. While this argument standing alone
would be unlikely to persuade the present Board, it is possible that
courts of appeals would, on review, find merit in it."' On the
other hand, due to the fact that the Board and the courts have not
set forth a clear statement as to just what is the duty of employers
and unions in this area, the parties are fearful of negotiations in this
area as well as particular contract language. Even in the light of
recent Board decisions it cannot be assumed that the typical manage-
ment rights clause will give the company the unilateral right to
move its plant; on the other hand, a union is fearful of proposing
limiting language and then finding itself signing an agreement
without such limiting language in it. The result of this could be,
as pointed out above, a finding of a waiver of its right to bargain
with the company over its decision. Some questions which arise
are, for example, whether the traditional impasse rule will be ap-
plied in this area, how long the discussions must last if in fact dis-
cussions are necessary, what is the union's right to information,"'
-10 Another serious question is whether such matters as contract language, prior
negotiating history should be passed upon at all by the N.LRB, or whether this
is a matter to be left solely to the arbitration procedures under the collective bargain-
ing agreement. In regard to arbitration of plant removal cases see Dolgen, The Remedy
of Plant Return mn the Arbitration of Plant Removal Cases, 11 ILR R1SHtCH 10
(Feb. 1966). Depending on the contract language (or lack thereof), arbitrat-
ors often decide the rights in cases involving basic managerial decisions. For example
see Sivyer Steel Castings Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 449 (Arb. Howlett, 1962); United Pack-
ers, Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. 619 (Arb. Kelliher, 1962) (upholding the companies' right
to shut down and relocate); Air Prods. & Chem., Inc., 39 Lab. Arb. 807 (Arb. Mc-
Dermott, 1962); Weyerheuser Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 308 (Arb. Sembower, 1961) (up-
holding the companies' right to transfer' operations from one plant to another) For
some decisions contra see cases cited in Dolgen, supra.
"'This question of the duty to supply information under § 8(a) (5) of the act
poses extremely difficult problems since under Board and court decisions almost any
relevant data must be furnished during collective bargaining, if requested by the union.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Taylor Forge & Pipe Works
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and whether the concurring opinion in Fibreboard truly states the
current thinking of the Supreme Court. Until the Board or the
courts or both are able to set forth some dear lines by which man-
agement and unions can guide themselves in the negotiations of
these basic managerial decisions there will be difficulty in the prac-
tical aspects of the problem." 2
VII. CONCLUSION
In practice, it appears that the effect of the recent decisions in
regard to the bargaining duty has resulted in confusion, wasted ef-
fort, and, curiously enough, a breakdown in the institution of col-
lective bargaining. Although, in theory, the Board's policy of
bargaining about a deczszon appears reasonable, the desired result
has not been attained. Companies, not sure of exactly what the obli-
gation entails, and fearful of disastrous remedies" 3 in the event of
violating the obligation, are sometimes overly cautious and in some
instances will go to great lengths to "appear" to have bargained
prior to making a decision. This latter situation has in fact been
forced upon companies in particular situations due to the actual
practicalities of a problem. A company may, because of economic
and business conditions, have to close down all or part of an opera-
tion, or move all or part of an operation, and there is no way that
such a result can be avoided. However, because of the necessity of
v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 227 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 352 U.S. 942 (1956); Boston Herald-
Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955); NLRB v. The Item Co., 220
F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947 (2d
Cit. 1951); Glen Raven Knitting Mills, 115 N.L.R.B. 422 (1956)
112 For a consideration of some of the practical ramifications of the duty to bargain
over basic managerial decisions see Goetz, The Duty to Bargain Ahout Changes n
Operations, 1964 DUK13L.J. 1; see also Anderson, Plant Removals and Subcontracting
of Work, 15 LAB. Lj. 609 (1964).
113Remedies in refusal to bargain over basic managerial decisions have varied.
Originally, in Fibreboard, the Supreme Court upheld the Board's remedy of restoration
of the status quo ante, namely, re-establishment of the operation with back pay. Simi-
larly in Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 788 (1964), the Board ordered pay-
ment of back pay to affected employees until the company either (1) reinstituted
the operation; (2) reached an agreement with the union; or (3) reached an impasse
in bargaining. On the other hand, in Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294
(1962), the Board, taking into account the extreme financial situation, stated that
restoring the status quo ante would have a detrimental effect on the company and,
therefore, merely ordered bargaining on the effect of the termination. See also New
York Mirror, 58 L.R.R.M. 1465 (NLRB 1965) More recently, in American Mfg. Co.,
156 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1966), the Board, on remand from the court of appeals,
NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965), which upheld the § 8(a)
(5) finding but not the remedial order in toto, reversed that portion of its original
order requiring reinsttution of the operation but maintained its order in regard to
bargaining and reinstatement with back pay. But see Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B.
No. 59 (1965).
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bargaining with the union prior to the actual decision making,
elaborate plans, efforts, and documentation are required to guard
against legal action. The result is that a company, having in reality
already made its decision (or having its decision made for it) must
go through the motions of "good faith" bargaining when it is dear
that there is no course to take but the one already decided upon.
On the other hand, the recent decisions have tended to give
unions a weapon to use to attempt to prevent a basic decision, or at
least to hinder the making of such a decision. However, once the
actual negotiations over the "decision" begin and it becomes clear to
the union that nothing can be done to prevent the proposed man-
agement action, collective bargaining can deteriorate into a series of
threats and counter-threats until an agreement is reached in regard
to the effectuation of the decision, namely, the union will not
attempt to prevent the move, provided the employees are granted
appropriate monetary compensation.
It is submitted that where solutions are possible as a result of
collective bargaining over decisions, and where a sound collective
bargaining relationship has been in existence, there is no need for
the Fibreboard doctrine since the parties will undoubtedly handle
such matters in a reasonable manner on their own. Conversely, in
situations where collective bargaining solutions to certain problems
are not possible (either because the problems cannot be solved by
changes in wages or working conditions, or because the parties' rela-
tionsup has not been one that has been constructive), the Fibreboard
doctrine merely forces the parties to engage in fruitless "play act-
ing." Time, money, and energy are expended to no useful purpose.
In a recent case involving subcontracting, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals pointed up the problem." 4 The court upheld the
Board's finding of no violation of section 8(a) (5) of the act on the
basis that there was no "significant impact" on the employees. The
court discussed the bargaining problem in regard to subcontracting.
It was pointed out that employees' fears arising from unilateral dec-
sions are appreciated and the fact that the fears prove unfounded in
the future in no way lessens them. If such fears are proven legiti-
mate, the next step is litigation and perhaps a remedy after years of
struggle. On the other hand the court points out that a company's
position must also be considered. Protracted negotiation to the
point of impasse on a basic management decision during a contract
4 UMW v. NLRB, BNA 1966 DAILY LAB. REP. No. 67, at D-1 (March 14,
1966).
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term seems inappropriate. The court then stated that "it would be
an invaluable service to management and labor to develop appro-
priate procedures to deal with subcontracting issues arising from
time to time during the life of a collective bargaining agreement.
Negotiations of this type should not be the same as bargaining for a
contract. They need not be as formal or extensive, but some form
of negotiation is likely to be needed in the interest of industrial
peace during the life of the agreement." ' 5  The court also stated
that under certain circumstances action might be demanded of an
employer without delay and in such cases that action should be
allowed without bargaining or even notification. In cases where
there is no practical detriment to notifying the union and allowing
it an opportunity to be heard, this should be done; but the court
stated in this latter regard:
By notification and discussion, however, we mean an alterna-
tive in appropriate cases to full-scale collective bargaining. The
union should not be permitted to stall the company's decision
by insistence on protracted negotiations. The company should be
permitted, after listening to the union's suggestions, to accept or
reject them as its economic judgment dictates. But this does not
mean that ordinarily the employer should act without giving notice
and an opportunity for exchange of ideas. 16
It is submitted that the Fourth Circut's suggestion is construc-
tive and is equally as applicable in shutdown and movement cases
as in subcontracting cases. Without such a reasonable approach to
the problem of bargaining over dectszons rather than effects, the col-
lective bargaining process will break down in its ability to handle
the attendant problems.
Without guidelines to which employers and unions can reason-
ably conform, the confusion, error, and frustration will remain.
1 5 Id. at D-2.
116 Id. at D-3.
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